

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

28 September 1962

GENERAL McHUGH:

Reference our telephone  
conversation.

*SM*  
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Colonel, USAF  
Chief, Research & Analysis Div.

*Richardson has a  
copy. spec*

DRAFT/27September1962

SUBJECT: Political Considerations Involving Post-Castro  
Cuba

The mere possibility of a new Cuban situation requires us to do some serious thinking about what the post-Castro Cuba should be. It is manifestly unwise for any U. S. Government agencies to become publicly involved in such planning since it would damage our prestige in dealing with other Latin American countries. However, a non-Governmental private organization such as the Council on Foreign Relations or the Kintner Group at the University of Pennsylvania could study various designs for a post-Castro Cuba -- economic, political, agricultural, etc. Such a study by a private group might restrain an impulsive premature, all-out venture in Cuba, which our Government wants to avoid. It may also serve as an instrument for building a consensus to support initially a new Cuban political structure. Even though its origin may be outside of Cuba, such a consensus would offer direct political competition to Castro and Khrushchev.

A Cuban study group could draw information from many sources without committing itself to any single pressure

group. It might also be fruitful to encourage a "Friends of Cuba" committee, although care should be taken to insure that such a committee should not be subordinate to any elements of the Batista regime, the landed aristocracy of pre-Castro Cuba, the Church, or financial and economic interests in the United States. In short, the group should be as "clean as a hound's tooth."

There is no heroic figure such as Charles de Gaulle or Syngman Rhee to head up a government in exile. But one may emerge from the study group effort.

Plans should be developed for these contingencies, at a minimum:

a. U. S. (and possibly OAS) military occupation of Cuba.

b. Spontaneous revolution in Cuba.

Operations should follow this pattern:

a. Formation of a study group funded by some organization such as Fund for The Republic.

b. Publication of the group's intentions with emphasis on post-Castro Cuba.

c. A constructive plan for the preliminary occupation government.

- d. A consolidation of the resources.
5. A proposed constitution for the government of new Cuba.

If an invasion of Cuba occurs and preliminary planning of this nature has already been done by a private group, it would eliminate much confusion. A few preliminary steps could be taken by the U. S. military:

- a. Cataloging of personnel and resources available for occupation duty, preferably drawn from the Japanese experience.

- b. Cooperation with private interests in organizing a "Radio Free Cuba" and perhaps "Television Free Cuba." Broadcasts from a 500-foot TV tower in Florida would be easily received in Cuba.

- c. Careful cultivation of a small number of selected military people from both the Batista regime and from refugees from Castro's army. Somewhere in the group there must be a person of the caliber of Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines, who was so carefully selected by the Americans during World War II.

Perhaps some of these things are already being done, but they should be included in a grand strategy for a Cuban operation.